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Abstract: This paper examined the impact of Nigeria’s non-alignment on its 
internal security: lessons from the years of civil war. The authors made use of 
the secondary source of data collection. It was obtained from existing 
literatures to broaden their horizon in understanding some ideas, while some 
were very resourceful in building the thesis. It sees foreign policy as the 
decisions a country takes in respect of its relations with another countries. It 
observes that Nigeria officially took a non-alignment stance in her foreign 
policy thrust during the days of Balewa’s government. With this, Nigeria was 
still Pro-Western in her external relations. The paper seeks to find out the 
lessons learnt from the Nigerian civil war and how it has positively impacted 
on the direction of Nigeria’s foreign policy. It concludes that based from 
lessons of Nigeria’s non-alignment stance of the civil war years, therefore, 
Nigeria need to adopt more dynamic foreign policy that encompasses her 
domestic politics (internal stability), economic wellbeing and robust external 
relations so as to properly fit in the changing global world.  
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Introduction 
Nigeria gained her independence on 
October 1, 1960, and was admitted as 
the 99th member of the United Nations 
(UN) on October 7, 1960 at the 
Plenary of the 15th Regular Session of 
the UN General Assembly in New 
York where the country’s Prime 
Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa, acknowledged that peace and 
security are very vital to Nigeria’s 
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foreign policy. His address further 
asserts: 
It is the desire of Nigeria to 
remain on friendly terms with all 
nations and participate actively 
in the work of the UN; (b) 
Nigeria a large and populous 
country of over 35 million has 
absolutely no territorial or 
expansionist intention; (c) we 
shall not forget our old friends 
and we are proud to have been 
accepted as a member of the 
British Commonwealth. 
Nevertheless, we do not intend to 
ally ourselves as a matter of 
routine with any of the power 
blocs. We are committed to 
uphold the principles upon which 
the UN is founded; (d) Nigeria 
hopes to work with other African 
States for the progress of Africa 
and assist in bringing all African 
territories to a state of 
responsible independence 
(Abagen and Tyona, 2018a, pp. 
282 – 283). 
Foreign policy is a combination of 
aims and interests pursued and 
defended by the given State and its 
ruling class in its relations with other 
States, and the methods and means 
used by it for the achievement and 
defense of these purposes and 
interests. Foreign policy is the 
category of actions a government 
takes which deals with defense, 
security, international political and 
economic relations. It is the activity 
whereby a State deals with other 
States, non-governmental 
organizations, international 
organizations, and certain individuals 
(Ojo, 1990; Ezirim, 2011). 
Foreign policy must adequately pay 
absolute attention to domestic issues 
which are very essential for image-
building. It must be directed towards 
national security and welfare as well 
as encompasses economic, cultural, 
technical and scientific cooperation 
with countries in the international 
arena (Abagen and Tyona 2018b, p. 
41). The Foreign policy of every 
country deals first with the 
preservation of its independence, 
sovereignty and security, and second 
with the pursuit and protection of its 
economic interests. Since 
independence in 1960, Nigeria has 
continued to play a strategic role in 
fostering global and continental peace 
through its foreign policy framework 
and principles which defined 
Nigeria’s relations with other 
countries. Nigeria has over the years 
designed and adopted series of 
strategies to safeguard its national 
interests and to achieve set goals in 
international relations. These 
strategies are diverse and range from 
humanitarian aid, diplomacy, 
economic actions (such as providing 
financial assistance to some other 
countries) (Clinton, 2001;Wikipedia, 
2010). 
An effective foreign policy depends 
largely on the stability of the domestic 
political order, the strength, resilience 
and diversification of the national 
economy, the military might available 
for use if the situation arises, the level 
of industrialization of the economy 
and the quality of political and 
administrative leadership at home 
(Akindele, 1996). The military factor 
is an important factor of a nation’s 
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foreign policy, as it concerns efforts 
towards safeguarding the country 
from external threat or aggression or 
in a danger of being attacked or 
defeated (Mbachu, 2011, p.67). 
At independence, Nigeria inherited 
British trained Army. Britain also 
reserved the monopoly of supplies of 
military hardwaves and logistics. It is 
important to stress that Nigeria got her 
independence free from any form of 
violence. Nigeria’s military has not 
been conceived as a powerful 
instrument of foreign policy, although 
Nigeria played an important role in 
the UN Peace Operations in Congo 
crisis (1960-1966) and helping 
Tanzania in suppressing mutiny 
against the government in 1964. It 
was only the Nigerian civil war (1967 
– 1970) that seriously engaged the 
Nigerian military after which there 
has been no credible external 
aggression (Mbachu, 2011).  
During the days of General Yakubu 
Gowon as Nigeria’s Head of State, as 
stated by Gubak (2015, p 635) serious 
internal conflicts erupted which 
brought the nation to near state of 
disintegration. This had a serious 
impact on Nigeria’s external relations 
as the country could not play any 
active role in foreign policy except 
that officials were merely junketing 
round the globe to explain the 
circumstances of the fratricidal civil 
war which raged uninterruptedly for 
30 months i.e. 1967-1970. 
Meanwhile, the pro-Western posture 
of Nigeria’s foreign policy continued 
unabated and government had thought 
that by turning to her traditional 
friends in the West for assistance, the 
war would be expeditiously 
prosecuted. This was not to be the 
case, however, as the so-called 
traditional friends turned down her 
request for arms and ammunition, 
thus introducing a new dimension to 
the country’s perception of friends or 
enemies in external relations. 
Consequent upon this, Nigeria relaxed 
relations with the Eastern Europe, and 
government began to shift ground and 
open up to the Eastern bloc. Therefore 
this paper examines the impact of 
Nigerian’s.non-alignment foreign 
folicy on it’s internal security: lessons 
from the civil war years. 
 
Nigeria’s Non-Alignment Foreign 
Policy: A Brief Review 
According to Aluko (1981, pp. 122-
123) Nigeria remainsnon-aligned as 
she was in the pre-war days, but with 
a difference. Under Abubakar’s 
regime Nigeria professed to be non-
aligned, but instances of strong 
partialities to those he called ‘our old 
friends’ – the Western powers were 
many. When the Soviet Embassy was 
established in Lagos in 1961, the 
number of its diplomatic staff was 
limited to ten, whereas no such 
restrictions was placed on the 
diplomatic missions of Britain and the 
USA; and only five diplomatic car 
plates were allocated to the Soviet 
Embassy, one hundred each were 
given to the Americans and the 
British. 
Other instances of partiality to the 
West included, Abubakar’s defense of 
the resumption of atomic testing by 
the USA early in 1962, whereas in 
1961 he had condemned the Soviet 
Union for the breach of the 
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moratorium on atomic testing; his 
defense of the US-Belgian rescue 
operation in the Congo late in 1964; 
and his failure to condemn US 
involvement in Vietnam even in 1965 
when public opinion in many Western 
capitals favoured US withdrawal from 
that country. No aid was sought from 
the Soviet Union, Soviet scholarships 
for Nigerian students were not 
received with enthusiasm and the first 
trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union was not signed until 1963. In 
short, under Sir Abubakar, Nigeria’s 
non-alignment was, as put then on 
Radio Kaduna, ‘Pro-West’ (Aluko, 
1981). 
Again, in early April, 1969 the Soviet 
Union asked if she could be allowed 
to set up Consular posts in each of the 
eleven State capitals then securely 
under the Federal control. But the 
government turned down this request 
(Aluko, 1981). The Balewa’s 
government’s decision to delay 
opening an Embassy in Moscow until 
1963, despite the Soviet Embassy was 
established in Lagos in 1961. Even 
the movement of Soviet Embassy 
officials was restricted to Lagos only, 
and under the surveillance of 
Nigeria’s security agents (Mbachu, 
2011).  The above assertions clearly 
shows that the Balewa’s government 
did not uphold the Nigerian foreign 
policy principle of not to align with 
any of the power blocs. It was purely 
and absolutely pro-Western in nature 
and character. 
In view of the above therefore, it is 
important to define non-alignment in 
contemporary unipolar world so as to 
equip analysis. A unipolar world 
essentially is a scenario where must of 
the world region’s economic, social, 
cultural aspects are influenced by a 
single state/country. Non-alignment 
foreign policy is very much relevant 
in contemporary world, even after the 
dismembering of the USSR. It still 
abides by its founding principle, ideal 
and purpose to establish a peaceful 
and prosperous world. Non-alignment 
member countries of the world played 
an active role in criticizing the United 
State (US) action such as invasion of 
Iraq and the war on terrorism, Iran 
and North Korea nuclear plants have 
been attempting to stifle by the US 
have been brought to notice of non-
alignment members as violation of 
human right and committing 
roughshod means to denounce the 
sovereignty of smaller nations. As a 
non- alignment member, Nigeria can 
act on that platform to protect the 
interest of developing nations. It 
protect it from high and influential 
power in the international sphere, solt 
disputes arises between developed and 
developing nations of any point of 
concerned topic, The non- alignment 
members act as platform which 
negotiates and concludes disputes 
peaceful securing the favorable 
decisions for each member nation. For 
example, Nigeria under the platform 
of the African Union (AU) is one 
among the countries in the world 
negotiating peaceful talks with Britain 
to return the Diego Garcia Island 
(Chagos Archipelago) to Mauritius 
who are the original owners. It could 
be recalled that Diego Garcia is an 
Island of the British Indian Ocean 
Territory and overseas Territory of the 
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United Kingdom (UK), it is a 
militarized atoll just south of the 
equator in the central Indian ocean, 
and the largest of 60 small island 
comprising the Chagos, Archipelago. 
It was first discovered by Europeans 
and named by the Portuguese, settled 
by the French in the 1790s and 
transferred to British rule after the 
Napoleonic Wars. It was one of the 
“Dependencies” of the British Colony 
of Mauritius until the Chagos islands 
were detached for from inclusion in 
the newly created British Indian 
Ocean Territory (BIOT)  in 1965 
(Wikipedia, 2019). 
In April. 1966 the British Government 
bought the entire assets of th Chagos. 
Agalega Company in the BIOT for 
ϵ600,000 and administered them as a 
government enterprise. On December 
, 30, 1966, the US and UK executed 
an agreement through an Exchange of 
Notes which permitted the US to use 
the BIOT for defense purpose for 50 
years until December 2016, followed 
by a 20 years extension (to 2036). The 
Diego Garcia island is used as a 
foreign military base by the US until 
date, Therefore, on June 23,2017, the 
United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) voted in favour of referring 
the territorial dispute between 
Mauritius and the UK to the 
International Court of Justice(ICJ) in 
order to clarify the legal status of the 
Chagos Islands Archipelago in the 
Indian Ocean. The motion was 
approved by a majority vote with 94 
voting for and 15 against. In February 
2019, the ICJ in The Hage ruled that 
the UK must transfer the Islands to 
Mauritius as hey were not legally 
separated from the latter in1965. In 
May, 2019, the UNGA affirmed the 
decision of the ICJ and demanded that 
the UK withdraw its colonial 
administration from the Islands and 
cooperate  with Mauritius to 
facilitates the resettlement  of 
Mauritian nationals in the 
Archipetago. But, in a written 
statement, the US Government said 
neither the Americans nor the British 
have any plans to discontinue use of 
the military base on Diego Garcia 
(Wikipedia, 2019)                                    
 
The Nigerian Civil War and Its 
Impact on Her Foreign Policy 
According to Fawole (2003, pp. 56-
57) the impact of the civil war on 
domestic and foreign policies are 
enormous. The declaration of 
secession by Biafra under Colonel 
Odumegwu Ojukwu in 1967 was an 
attempt to break up the most populous 
former British colony in Africa. The 
basic propaganda was that the Ibos 
were no longer safe in the 
Commonwealth of Nigeria and 
therefore, had been pushed to 
seceding from the country. The 
government was not going to allow 
the country to be dismembered, so a 
state of war was declared by the 
Federal Government. What eventually 
turned out to be a gruesome 30 
months civil war began on July 6, 
1967 as what the Federal Government 
termed “a police action” allegedly to 
make Biafra realize the futility of a 
break-up. The Federal Government 
was of the view that it was going to be 
short, surgical operation that would 
probably last only a few weeks. This 
was not to be so. The whole nation 
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was engrossed in a war that lasted 
beyond their initial expectation and 
was much bloodier than had been 
anticipated. Over a million civilians 
and soldiers reportedly died on both 
sides before it was brought to a 
conclusion in January 1970. The huge 
casualty figure was not caused by the 
shooting and bombings alone, but also 
by starvation, disease and dislocation.  
To Mbachu, (2011) during the early 
part of the Nigerian crisis, Britain 
played a crucial role in making sure 
that Nigeria remained a single 
country. With vast, British 
investments in Nigeria, it could hardly 
be expected that Nigeria would be 
allowed by Britain to plunge into a 
crisis that would shatter British 
economic interest in the country. 
Nigeria had by then become a major 
producer of crude oil. British firms 
such as the Nigeria-Anglo-Dutch 
Company and the Shell B.P. had 
extended the scene early enough, and 
taken control of Nigeria’s oil industry. 
By 1979, more than half of Nigeria’s 
crude oil was under British production 
(although the Nigerian government 
had at this point acquired 55 percent 
of equity shares in the companies). 
In another development, Britain was 
not particularly decisive regarding 
whether to publicly support Federal 
Nigeria against the Biafran state that 
controlled most of the oil wells under 
Colonel Ojukwu, who was at that time 
Governor of the Eastern Region. 
Shortly after the start of hostilities, 
Britain placed an embargo on the sale 
of arms to the Federal Government, 
inspite of pressure for the sale of 
aircraft, bomb, tanks and heavy field 
guns. Some other Western countries 
such as the United States, France and 
the Netherlands followed the British 
example at a time when Nigeria relied 
largely on British weapons (Mbachu, 
2011).  
However, the position of Britain to 
remain neutral at the beginning of the 
Nigerian civil war was therefore 
regarded by the Federal Government 
of Nigeria as a betrayal of a former 
friend.In view of the British 
government’s lukewarm attitude 
towards her former friend-Nigeria, 
thus, Nigeria had to turn Eastward, 
especially, the Soviet Union for a 
military deal agreement in early 
August, 1967. The Soviet Union 
supplied military equipment such as 
aircraft, arms and ammunition to 
Nigeria and she was able to prosecute 
the civil war.  
Again, the civil war according to 
Fawole (2003) actually allowed 
Nigeria to understand and identify its 
real enemies in and out of Africa. The 
first major adversaries to show their 
hands were apartheid South Africa 
and Rhodesia under white supremacist 
rule. The two countries had a known 
grouse with Nigeria, a country which 
has stood in stiff opposition to racist 
tendencies. The civil war provided a 
unique opportunity for them to have 
their pound of flesh, and thus pitted 
their camp with the Biafrans to 
dismember Nigeria or at least render it 
a weak and ineffectual adversary on 
the continent. Portugal also supported 
Biafra, gave money and materials, and 
served as the headquarters in Europe 
for arms acquisition. Lisbon served as 
the conduit through which arms and 
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other materials acquired in Europe 
were assembled for onward shipment 
to Biafra. 
The above mentioned nations have 
their grouse with Nigeria and it is 
important to properly give a brief 
review of their roles in the Nigerian 
civil war so as to have a better 
understanding. Nigeria supported the 
expulsion of South Africa from the 
Commonwealth in 1961 (Abagen and 
Tyona, 2018b). Nigeria’s relentless 
opposition to apartheid eventually 
made it South Africa’s number one 
enemy on the continent. The military 
government of General Ironsi banned 
Portuguese ships and aircraft going 
and coming from South Africa from 
using Nigeria’s port facilities and 
airspace (Fawole, 2003) 
The role of France as Nigeria’s 
greatest enemy in Africa came out in 
bolder relief than hitherto suspected 
or imagined. France was strategically 
positioned to cause Nigeria serious 
havoc if it chose to do so. Apart from 
being an acknowledged military 
power and the only one that had 
always deployed large numbers of its 
troops on African soil, it deployed a 
large force equipped with 
sophisticated firepower into Chad 
while the tide of the war was turning 
against Biafra. This force was 
probably intended to pile up 
psychological pressures on the 
Federal authorities (Fawole, 2003). 
The grouse France had with Nigeria is 
when the Nigerian government in 
1961 broke diplomatic ties with 
France over the testing of nuclear 
weapons in the Sahara desert (Abagen 
and Tyona, 2018b). Thus, the just 
mentioned made France to distaste 
Nigeria for belittling her prestige in 
the African continent.  
Furthermore, the outbreak of the civil 
war provided perhaps the greatest 
opportunity for France to act out its 
morbid hatred of Nigeria, a country 
which Paris had always perceived as 
the only obstacle to French hegemony 
in Africa. Nigeria had to be mindful 
of French capacity for harm and 
mischief. This is because Nigeria is 
strategically surrounded on all sides 
and shares contiguous borders with 
the Francophone States of Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger Republic and Benin 
Republic, in addition to several other 
Francophone States in West and 
Central Africa. Once the war erupted, 
France saw a golden opportunity to 
work for the dismemberment of the 
only Anglophone behemoth that 
served as a major obstacle to the 
achievement of its objective of 
complete and unfettered hegemony in 
Africa. Thus, France promptly 
accorded diplomatic recognition to 
Biafra and went ahead to provide 
military and material assistance to the 
rebels (Fawole, 2003). 
Similarly,Fawole maintained that 
France even attempted to use 
Nigeria’s contiguous neighbours 
especially Benin Republic for 
gunrunning to Biafra. It tried to 
persuade other French colonies to 
throw in their support for the rebels. 
But Nigeria was fortunate in the sense 
that majority of African States, with 
the exception of Ivory Coast, Gabon, 
Tanzania and Zambia, saw the 
wisdom in adhering to the doctrine 
that the borders of African States 
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inherited from colonization were 
sacrosanct and thus could not be 
withdrawn by force. Many of them 
realized that their own fragile multi-
ethnic composition could also be 
threatened should the Biafran 
experiment be allowed to succeed. 
As for Rhodesia, Nigeria was in the 
forefront to champion the 
international boycotts against the 
white supremacists under the 
leadership of Ian Smith of Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe) in 1965 when he 
proclaimed unilateral declaration of 
independence from Great Britain. 
This happened during the Balewa’s 
government and he organized and 
hosted the first Commonwealth 
summit in early January, 1966 that 
ever held outside the British soil to 
deliberate on the Rhodesian issue. The 
Balewa’s government was toppled by 
a bloody military coup a few days 
after that Commonwealth summit. 
The military junta that came on board, 
headed by General Aguiyi-Ironsi did 
not change from Balewa’s position 
regarding Rhodesia. Records also 
have it that the General Ironsi military 
government equally denied Portugal 
the use of Nigeria’s airspace and port 
facilities to its aircraft and ships. 
Therefore, this act by the Federal 
government of Nigeria made it 
Portugal’s enemy. It is important to 
note that, the apartheid South Africa, 
France and Portugal united in their 
common wish to dismember Nigeria 
during her civil war periods. 
 
Lessons Learnt from the Nigerian 
Civil War 
The Nigerian government’s leaders 
drew some conclusions and lessons 
from the civil war, Aluko (1981, pp. 
118-121) mentioned the five main 
lessons learnt as follows: 
The first is that the country’s survival 
as a sovereign independent State can 
no longer be taken for granted and 
that the control and deployment of the 
country’s Police and Armed Forces 
must remain entirely with the Federal 
Government. Under the civilian 
regime of the late Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa no one believed there could 
be any threat to Nigeria’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. As a result the 
Federal Government was content with 
an Army of under 10,000 men whose 
main functions were regarded as 
ceremonial and for occasional Police 
support. This notion was shattered by 
the war. From bitter experience, the 
Federal Government has learnt that it 
must build up and maintain powerful 
modern Armed Forces to deter any 
future threat to the country’s 
sovereignty and survival. This is the 
main reason given by General Gown 
for not demobilizing at the end of the 
war. 
It has now been said that because of 
the small size of the Nigerian Armed 
Forces at the beginning of the war in 
July, 1967, the British government 
actually advised General Gowon 
against declaring war on Biafra on the 
ground that it might be ‘unwinable’ 
and might lead to the country’s 
disintegration. This mistake will not 
be allowed to repeat itself: the 
government decided to maintain its 
Armed Forces of about 200,000 men 
and to continue to recruit specialists 
and it plans to make the Nigerian Air 
Force the most powerful in black 
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Africa. Before the civil war, although 
the Nigerian Police Force was under 
the overall control of the Federal 
government, the former Regional 
Premiers had virtually absolute 
control over the Nigerian Policemen 
in their Regions through the 
Commissioners of Police who were 
directly responsible to them. 
Apart from this, the former Northern 
and Western Regions maintained their 
local government Police Force. Under 
the civilian regime, the Nigerian 
Army had been a unified force under 
the direct control of the Federal 
Government. But it was decided at the 
Aburi meetings of 4th – 5th January, 
1967, that Area Commands should be 
set up in each of the existing Regions. 
The effect of this was to divide the 
control of the Army between the 
Federal Government and the regional 
military governors-each virtually 
controlling the troops in his region. 
This situation contributed 
substantially to the ease with which 
Colonel Ojukwu carried both the 
Army and the Police of the former 
Eastern Region into Secessionist 
forces. So the federal government has 
now placed all police forces under its 
direct control. Likewise the army has 
been reorganized into a centrally 
directed, unified force under General 
Gown as Supreme Commander. 
The second major lesson of the war is 
the need to have friendly governments 
in neighbouring countries. If Nigeria 
had been surrounded by hostile 
neighbours, she would probably have 
lost the war. If Niamey, Fort Lamy, 
Yaounde, Cotonou and Lome had 
been used as staging posts by the gun-
running aircraft, instead of Liberville, 
Sao Tome and Abidjan, the effect on 
Nigeria would have been more 
serious. Nobody understood this more 
than the Nigerian leaders. This is why 
they could not easily forgive Dr. 
Emile Zinsou, then President of 
Dahomey (Benin), for allowing 
Cotonou to be used by the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross early in 1969, ostensibly for 
sending relief supplies to Biafra, and 
for breaking the federal blockade. Dr. 
Zinsou’s visit to Lagos later in the 
year and his explanation that arms and 
military equipment were not hidden in 
the relief supplies shipped from 
Cotonou were not convincing to the 
Nigerians. This led to a border clash 
between the two countries in mid-
1969 and until the overthrow of Dr. 
Zinsou’s government, relations with 
Dahomey were uneasy. The Nigerians 
were happy at his overthrow for he 
was said to have been manipulated 
into working against Nigeria by what 
many Nigerian papers called 
‘international do-gooders’. 
The third major lesson of the war is 
that the existence of minority white-
dominated regimes in Southern Africa 
is a direct threat to Nigeria’s security. 
Before the civil war, Nigeria’s 
oppositions to these minority white 
supremacist regimes and to South 
Africa’s membership of the 
Commonwealth was based largely on 
moral grounds. South Africa was not 
seen as posing any threat to Nigeria. 
Indeed Sir Abubakar’s government 
was opposed to ‘the premature 
granting of independence to the 
African majority in Southern Africa. 
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Instead it favoured independence for 
the Africans in Southern Africa after a 
careful preparation which could take 
some time depending on the 
development of each territory.  
But these ideas have now been thrown 
aside owing to the moral and material 
support given by these minority 
white-dominated regimes to the 
secessionist forces. Dr. Okoi Arikpo, 
Commissioner for External Affairs, 
said that the first bomb dropped on 
Lagos by Biafra was made in 
Rhodesia. Though difficult to prove, 
this was believed to be true by the 
Nigerian government leaders and that 
is what is important. Realizing the 
threat posed to its independence and 
survival by these minority regimes, 
the Nigerian government since 1967 
has been committed to a radical policy 
towards them. 
The fourth lesson of the civil war is 
that it is dangerous to depend too 
much on one power bloc or group of 
countries and to rely entirely on 
external sources for the supply of 
arms required to maintain internal 
security. The unwillingness of all the 
Western powers including Britain 
(who only changed her attitude after 
the Soviet Union had agreed to supply 
Nigeria with military aircraft in 
August, 1967) to sell arms to Nigeria 
at the beginning of hostilities 
persuaded the Nigerian leaders that 
their previous attitude to the West 
needed urgent review. In fact the 
Nigerians were convinced that but for 
the tenuous link with the Soviet 
Union in the past, which made it 
possible to arrange the arms deal 
quickly early in August, 1967, the 
secession could have triumphed. The 
agonizing delay involved in getting 
arms delivery from abroad and the 
furore raised in many Western 
capitals about arms supply to Nigeria 
drove it home to Nigerian leaders that 
the country must have her own 
armament factories to reduce her 
reliance on external sources for some 
type of arms and ammunition. So 
Nigeria must develop her own 
resources to provide an industrial base 
not only for a higher standard of 
living but also for arms production. 
The fifth lesson is to teach the 
Nigerian leaders the importance and 
the value of publicity in the conduct 
of external relations. Before the civil 
war, the Nigerian government did not 
realize the importance of propaganda 
in diplomacy. The Abubakar 
government was content to rely on 
traditional forms of diplomacy that 
rejected propaganda as an instrument 
of policy. The number of Nigeria’s 
overseas missions early in 1966 was 
39 (compared to Ghana’s 66); only 5 
of these had press attaches and these 
were based in London, New York, 
Congo (Kinshasa), Monrovia and 
Abijan. But the skillful and successful 
way in which Biafra used propaganda 
baffled the Nigerian government. 
Biafra propaganda succeeded in 
persuading many international 
humanitarian agencies and powerful 
world leaders, including the Pope, that 
Nigeria was bent on genocide. The 
effect of the Biafran propaganda 
campaign could have been reduced, if 
the Nigerian government had earlier 
realized the value of external 
publicity. To counteract the damaging 
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effect of this propaganda, which was 
being handled by professional public 
relations firms (namely, the Mark 
Press in Geneva and, for some time, 
the firm of Robert S. Goldstein in the 
USA), the Nigerian government, 
albeit belatedly, employed in 1968 
professional public relations firms 
such as the London firm of Galitzine, 
the Burson Marteller Associates in 
Washington and later the firm of 
Robert S. Goldstein which had earlier 
served the Biatrans. 
With the war over, the Nigerian 
government terminated its contracts 
with professional public relations 
firms; in their place, it has expanded 
and added to its own external 
publicity organs. Early in 1970 a new 
division of external publicity with an 
initial estimated expenditure of £ 405, 
290 during the 1970/1 financial year 
was set up for the first time under the 
Federal Ministry of Information. 
Instead of the previous five centres 
where Nigeria had press attaches, they 
became eleven, viz, London, Paris, 
New York (for the Consulate 
General), New York (for Latin 
America), Washington, Stockholm, 
Bonn, Moscow, Ottawa, Cairo and 
Nairobi. What in fact has guided the 
government in the choice of these 
centre’s is the determination to undo 
the remaining damaging effects of 
Biafran propaganda; nine of the 
eleven information offices overseas 
are located in Europe and North 
America where support and sympathy 
for the secessionists had been great 
during the civil war. 
In addition, the government has 
already announced plans to modernize 
the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation so that the voice of 
Nigeria can be heard distinctly 
through various short wavelengths in 
Africa, Asia, Europe and North and 
South America. To boost its external 
publicity programme, the Federal 
Government for the first time since 
independence approved an estimate of 
£100,000 for the 1970/1 financial year 
for publicity by its heads of missions 
overseas. Before early 1970 external 
publicity was left entirely to the press 
division of overseas missions whose 
staff are not members of the Nigerian 
Foreign Service, but of the Federal 
Ministry of Information. This fact was 
said to have caused a lot of difficulties 
in the past. It is to minimize these and 
to involve the various heads of 
missions more directly in external 
publicity that this measure was taken. 
One of the main reasons for 
increasing the number of Nigeria’s 
overseas establishments since July, 
1967 is to give Nigeria external 
publicity. Nigeria had, even during 
the war, increased its missions from 
39 to 50. 
Therefore, the impact of the civil war 
has made the contemporary Nigerian 
government to have a more friendly 
relations with her immediate 
neighbors, as they can protect and 
enhance physical security  of 
Nigerians against external threat. For 
instance, presently the Nigerian 
Government is in security and 
intelligent cooperation with Chad, and 
Niger Republic fighting the Boko 
Haram terrorizing some parts of 
Nigeria. Again, the impact of the civil 
war has brought into being arms 
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manufacturing in Nigeria and has 
made the Nigerian armed forces to be 
more equipped with logistics and 
military equipment required to 
maintain internal security.        
The Post Civil War and Nigerian 
Foreign Policy: The Paradigms 
Shift 
According to Adeniji (2005) 
following the civil war, Nigeria’s 
foreign policy concentrated on the 
creation of the appropriate 
international environment that would 
be conducive for the implementation 
of the domestic policy underscored by 
what came to be known as the three 
Rs-Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement. Assistance in these 
initiatives came by way of the Arab 
oil embargo which shot up the price 
of crude oil and brought 
unprecedented boom to the Nigerian 
economy. In addition, their desire to 
have a stake in the infrastructural 
reconstruction and the oil boom 
helped to put Nigeria’s relations with 
the developed countries on sound 
footing. This was in spite of the 
indigenization policy at the time. The 
Soviet bloc also entered into the circle 
of Nigeria’s friends and economic 
partners. 
Equally, this period also coincided 
with the dynamic and pro-active 
government of General 
Murtala/Obasanjo which brought 
vigour and vitality into the realization 
of our foreign policy objectives. A lot 
of attention was focused on Africa. In 
the area of decolonization, not only 
was Nigeria recognized as a credible 
voice of Africa internationally; she 
devoted enormous resources to assist 
freedom fighters in Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe), South-West Africa 
(Namibia), Mozambique, Angola and 
apartheid South Africa until freedom 
was achieved. Little wonder she 
became counted as one of the 
“frontline” States, despite her 
geographical distance from the theatre 
of these struggles. At the UN, she 
served as Chairman of the UN’s 
Committee Against Apartheid 
(Adeniji, 2005). 
In the same light, this period has been 
recorded by observers as the most 
eventful in Nigeria’s foreign relations. 
Nigeria played very pivotal role in the 
formation of the Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in 1975, and also laid the 
foundation for the formation, much 
later, of the Lagos Plan of Action in 
1980. These initiatives, in line with 
the consistent tilt in our foreign policy 
perspectives, were aimed at 
accelerating the pace and broaden the 
scope of economic cooperation 
between African States. The hosting 
in 1977 of the 2nd Black and African 
Festival of Arts and Culture 
(FESTAC) was a manifest expression 
of Nigeria’s commitment to 
promoting and advancing the cause of 
black in Diaspora (Adeniji, 2005). 
The paradigm shift in Nigeria foreign 
policy will be better appreciated with 
the inception of democratic rule from 
1999 to date. Obasanjo’s accession to 
power in May 1999 required new 
approach to Nigeria’s foreign policy. 
To be sure, the international security 
environment had altered significantly 
for Nigeria at this period, with the 
emergence of multivariate level of 
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threats to the task of nation building. 
This period was marked 
fundamentally with the linkage of 
domestic issues with international 
relations and the gradual erosion of 
the concept of absolutist sovereignty. 
As a matter of fact, the ‘concentric 
rings’ of Nigeria’s foreign policy 
priorities which relegated the global 
societies to the fourth level, indicating 
that national, sub-regional, and 
regional concerns should precede the 
international agenda was fast losing 
its relevance (Ayam, 2004; Dokubo, 
2010; Alao, 2011; Magbadelo, 2007) 
cited in (Fayomi, Chidozie and Ajayi, 
2015). 
Furthermore, Alao (2011) notes that, 
this new era of foreign policy differed 
from the preceding period in Nigeria’s 
diplomacy, in which it had always 
prioritized sub-regional and 
continental interest. The relative 
stability along these fronts enabled the 
country to strike a better balance 
between external polices and domestic 
interests. This was especially 
important because many Nigerians 
believed that the country had little to 
show for the generosity and sacrifices 
it had made in regional and 
continental diplomacy. Many also felt 
that Nigeria should replace its past 
practice of confronting major powers 
in the pursuit of an African-centered 
agenda with a new practice than better 
suited Nigeria’s national interests.  
With the emergence of President 
Obasanjo in 1999, there was a 
paradigm shift from an African-
centered, to a global-focused, foreign 
policy. Nigeria’s foreign policy still 
remained essentially Africa-focused at 
the political level while it was global-
centered at the economic level. The 
poor situation of the Nigerian 
economy inherited by Obasanjo 
coupled with political vulnerability at 
the time, demanded new tactics and 
strategies, and indeed, prompted the 
need to focus greater attention on 
extra-African actors, without 
necessarily implying any form of 
neglect of Africa. Thus, Nigeria 
emphasized the economic factor to the 
detriment of political considerations 
(Akinterinwa, 2004 cited in Fayomi, 
Chidozie, and Ajayi, 2015). 
Therefore, this dramatic shift was 
explicated by President Obasanjo, that 
Nigeria’s foreign policy interests 
extend: beyond our concern for well 
being of our continent. The debt 
burden is not an exclusively African 
predicament. Many countries in Asia, 
the Caribbean and South America are 
facing similar problems with it. It is 
imperative therefore that the countries 
of these regions harmonize their 
efforts in their search for fairer a deal 
from the industrialized nations of the 
world and this requires of us a more 
global approach to world affairs than 
was previously the case (cited in 
Fayomi, Chidozie, and Ajayi, 2015).   
To Alao (2011) a number of major 
trends are clearly discernible in 
Nigeria’s foreign policy since 1999. 
Perhaps the most important of these is 
the desire to establish and maintain 
friendships with countries that have 
historically shaped global diplomacy, 
while cultivating deep alliances with 
emerging powers featured in recent 
global economic developments. 
Nigeria has also sought to align its 
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diplomacy with domestic 
developments, especially as these 
relate to the consolidation of its new 
democracy. Consequently, the 
country’s diplomacy from 1999 to 
2011 has been a cautious balance of 
devotion to traditional obligations 
towards West Africa and African 
concerns, and the desire to ensure that 
external relations, especially with 
global powers also assists in domestic 
concerns. 
Equally, even the present President 
Muhammadu Buhari administration 
have followed same on the paradigm 
shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust 
as embarked by his predecessors and 
even much more better in this 
democratic era. He (Buhari) also 
redirected Nigeria’s foreign policy to 
lead to countries of the world where 
there are technical assistance, 
development funds, economic 
cooperation and military 
collaboration.  
 
Conclusion 
What we have done in this paper is to 
look at non-alignment as a redirection 
of Nigeria’s foreign policy. It could 
be recalled that in October, 1960 
when Nigeria got her independence, 
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 
Nigeria’s First Prime Minister was 
saddled with the responsibility or task 
of defining and forming Nigeria’s 
foreign policy thrust that will favour 
the yearnings of the citizenry 
domestically and externally. In his 
official pronouncement, Balewa 
maintained that his government’s 
foreign policy will not ally with any 
of the power blocs and shall not forget 
her old or traditional friends within 
the African continent and beyond. 
After, declaring his government non-
alignment stance, Balewa pursed pro-
Western foreign policies to all the 
Western countries, with Britain in the 
forefront of Nigeria’s external 
relations, followed by the United 
States of America among others. 
Balewa’s government foreign policies 
were partial in character and nature, 
especially with the Eastern bloc, 
which they barely had external 
relations with.  
With the outbreak of the Nigerian 
civil war from 1967 to 1970, the 
Federal governments of Nigeria 
turned to her traditional friends in the 
West, particularly Britain to assist her 
prosecute the war, but shockingly, 
Britain turned her back on Nigeria and 
refused to sale aircraft, arms and 
ammunition to Nigeria and in fact, our 
colonial masters took a neutral 
position. Even other Western nations, 
such as France, the Netherlands, USA 
placed embargo on the sale of military 
equipment to Nigeria. At that time the 
Federal government of Nigeria relied 
mostly on British arms and 
ammunition. Therefore, this brought a 
new dimension on the non-alignment 
stance of Nigeria’s foreign policy. 
Nigeria had to turn Eastward, 
especially to the Soviet Union and 
ally with them for the supply of 
weapons and other military equipment 
to prosecute the civil war. The new 
Soviet-Nigerian relationship was 
forced by the Britain’s lukewarm 
attitude to Nigeria in a time of 
national threat. This relationship led 
to the increased in Nigerian economic 
dealings with the Soviet Union. Since 
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then, Nigeria had learnt her lesson to 
be self-reliance and has redirected her 
foreign policy principle of non-
alignment. The paradigm shift in 
Nigeria’s foreign policy came as a 
result of the experiences of her civil 
war with the Biafran secessionists. 
Now Nigeria is friendly with all 
nations of the world. One of the 
fundamental shifts of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy thrust is the logical 
influence of democratization and 
globalization of the international 
environment that Nigeria stands to 
benefit largely. 
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